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ABSTRACT 
 
We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as 
opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the “endowment effect,” 
account for reported gaps between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept 
(“WTA”). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus 
regarding the nature or robustness of WTA-WTP gaps. Second, while experimenters are 
careful to control for subject misconceptions, there is no consensus about the 
fundamental properties of misconceptions or how to avoid them. Instead, by 
implementing different types of experimental controls, experimenters have revealed 
notions of how misconceptions arise. Experimenters have applied these controls 
separately or in different combinations. Such controls include ensuring subject 
anonymity, using incentive compatible elicitation mechanisms, and providing subjects 
with practice and training on the elicitation mechanism before employing it to measure 
valuations. The pattern of results reported in the literature suggests that the widely 
differing reports of WTA-WTP gaps could be due to an incomplete science regarding 
subject misconceptions. We implement a “revealed theory” methodology to compensate 
for the lack of a theory of misconceptions. Theories implicit in experimental procedures 
found in the literature are at the heart of our experimental design. Thus, our approach to 
addressing subject misconceptions reflects an attempt to control simultaneously for all 
dimensions of concern over possible subject misconceptions found in the literature. To 
this end our procedures modify the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism used in 
previous studies to elicit values. In addition, our procedures supplement commonly used 
procedures by providing extensive training on the elicitation mechanism before subjects 
provide WTP and WTA responses. Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and 
mugs, goods frequently used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified 
procedures, we observe no gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, our results call into 
question the interpretation of observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion or prospect 
theory. Further evidence is required before convincing interpretations of observed gaps 
can be advanced. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=615861 
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The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject 
Misconceptions and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations  
 
Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler* 
 
 
1  Introduction 
A subtle controversy exists in the literature. At issue is the existence and interpretation of a 
possible gap between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”).1 Such a gap 
is frequently reported in the literature, and many broad claims have been made regarding the 
robustness of the gap and its implications. For example, summarizing experimental findings about 
the pervasiveness of the gap in a recent survey of the WTP-WTA gap literature, Horowitz et al. 
(2000) state, “Previous authors have shown that WTA is usually substantially larger than WTP, and 
almost all have remarked that the WTA/WTP ratio is much higher than their economic intuition 
would predict.” Furthermore, claims about the power of a particular theory to explain the gap are 
appearing with increasing frequency. Specifically, the interpretation of the gap as an "endowment 
effect" rests on a special theory of the psychology of preferences associated with "prospect theory." 
In particular, Knetsch, Tang and Thaler (2001) conclude, “The endowment effect and loss aversion 
has been one of the most robust findings of the psychology of decision making –people commonly 
value losses much more than commensurate gains.” Such claims regarding the nature and 
robustness of the gap have seeped into other areas of research including law and economics, and 
specific interpretations of the WTP-WTA gap accompany the claims. Rachlinski and Jourden 
(1998) begin their discussion of the implications of the WTP-WTA gap for legal doctrine by 
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1
 The WTP-WTA gap refers to a tendency for an individual to state a minimum amount for which that individual is 
willing to “sell” an item that is greater than the maximum amount the same individual is willing to pay to “buy” the 
item. Under conditions of sufficiently smooth preferences and the absence of wealth effects the two magnitudes should 
(theoretically) be the same. Some attribute observed gaps to loss aversion: the notion that the loss of the item due to a 
sale is more pronounced than a gain of the same item due to a purchase. For this reason, WTA-WTP gaps have come to 
be called “endowment effects.” We refer to this explanation of gaps as “endowment effect theory” to denote that the 
terminology is not simply a label for a particular phenomenon but rather implies a theoretical explanation of the 
observed phenomenon.  
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claiming, “Researchers in behavioral decision theory have developed a growing line of evidence 
that people appear to value a good that they own much more than an identical good that they do not 
own.... Researchers have used several different procedures to demonstrate the endowment effect.” 
The research reported here suggests that this broad discussion found in the literature is based on an 
incorrect interpretation of experimental results. 
In spite of the enthusiastic interpretations of the WTP-WTA gap as a fundamental feature of 
human preferences (e.g., referring to the gap as an “endowment effect”), in fact no consensus exists 
on whether the literature, considered in its entirety, supports such interpretations. While many 
experimenters have observed a WTA-WTP gap, others have failed to observe it. This variation in 
experimental results seriously undermines the claim that the gap is a fundamental feature of human 
preferences. Recognizing this, scholars who accept the psychological explanation of the gap have 
sought to explain the variation in terms of the commodity used in experiments (e.g., mugs, lotteries, 
money, candy, etc.). Some suggest that the existence and magnitude of the endowment effect 
depend on the commodity employed in the experiment. This observation led us to conclude that 
further examination of the nature of observed gaps is necessary before any convincing 
interpretation is possible. 
Although our review of the experimental literature revealed no consensus about the appropriate 
interpretation of observed WTA-WTP gaps, we did note an important consensus about the 
experimental procedures used to measure gaps. Implicitly, researchers unanimously agree that 
experimental procedures should be designed to minimize or avoid "subject misconceptions." Like 
its close cousin "confusion," however, the concept of "misconceptions" has not been 
operationalized formally and certainly not quantified. In fact its meaning changes from one 
experimental environment to another and from experimental study to experimental study. 
Consequently, a theory of misconceptions has not been developed. Nevertheless, controlling for 
subject misconceptions is necessary to determine whether they play an important role in the lack of 
consensus about the nature of the gap. 
Our approach in the face of this difficulty is to employ a “revealed theory methodology” to 
infer an operational meaning of subject misconceptions revealed by the myriad procedures 
experimentalists adopt to control for them. The procedures implicitly reflect different ideas about 
the form(s) that subject misconceptions might take. Our approach is to assume that, unless all 
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controls are exercised simultaneously, one cannot conclude that subject misconceptions have been 
eliminated.  
This observation leads to our main research question: If we design an experiment that 
completely controls for subject misconceptions as implicitly defined by the literature (i.e., an 
experiment that includes every procedure used in previous experiments to control for 
misconceptions), will we observe a WTA-WTP gap? 
This question led us toward a natural experiment design. The first step is to conduct 
experiments using procedures that frequently produce gaps. If we replicate the gap we can 
conclude that there is nothing special about the subject pools or us as experimenters that might 
eliminate the gap. The second step is to conduct experiments in which subject misconceptions are 
completely controlled by incorporating the union of procedures found in the literature. If a gap is 
observed under this treatment, the results would strongly support interpreting observed gaps as 
support for endowment effect theory. On the other hand, if a gap is not observed then the results 
would support the conjecture that the procedures themselves produce gaps and that gaps are 
unrelated to the nature of preferences, loss aversion and prospect theory. If the gap can be turned 
off and on using different sets of procedures then it likely does not reflect an asymmetry between 
gains and losses as posited by loss aversion. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews much of the WTA-WTP gap literature and 
is designed to document two facts. First, no consensus exists about the nature and robustness of the 
gap. Second, experimenters have employed a wide range of different and sometimes overlapping 
sets of procedures to control for subject misconceptions. Such differences in procedures could 
account for variations in the results if the specific procedures employed control for some facets of 
misconception but fail to control for others. More importantly, given that no theory of 
“misconceptions” exists, if subject misconceptions influence the existence or magnitude of the gap 
then the optimal method of investigating the influence of misconceptions is to implement the union 
of controls. Without a theory about the relationship between gaps and subject misconceptions, our 
objective is to cast a large net using a revealed theory methodology in the hopes of determining 
whether the procedures themselves cause gaps between WTA and WTP.  
Section 3 reports the results from our replication of an experiment reported by Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler (1990) (“KKT”). KKT’s results are cited widely as support for endowment 
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effect theory. Using their procedures, we replicate the gap with roughly the same magnitude they 
report. 
Section 4 describes in detail the experimental procedures we employ to study whether subject 
misconceptions account for observed gaps. The procedures reflect the conjecture that observed 
gaps are related to subjects’ misconceptions about the valuation task. We expound on exactly how 
and why we developed and employed specific procedures. These procedures represent the study’s 
central contribution. Section 4 also reports the striking result we obtain when we incorporate 
controls for subject misconceptions. When an incentive compatible mechanism is used to elicit 
valuations and subjects are provided with (1) a detailed explanation of the mechanism and how to 
arrive at valuations, (2) paid practice using the mechanism, and (3) anonymity, we observe no 
WTA-WTP gap. To investigate one conjecture regarding which procedures have the greatest 
impact, we designed a second experiment that is identical to the first except subjects are not 
provided paid practice using the mechanism. Again, we observe no statistically significant WTA-
WTP gap. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2  Experimental Procedures and the Literature 
We begin our exploration of experimental procedures by examining the literature, relying on the 
so-called “revealed theory methodology.” As will become evident, there is no single view on how 
to control for subject misconceptions. Table 1 provides a categorization of WTA-WTP gap 
experiments by experiment procedures. As endowment effect theory2 is our primary focus, we 
restrict our attention to the reported studies that investigate the possible existence or nature of an 
“endowment effect,” as opposed to mere WTA-WTP gaps. Several of these studies focus on the 
possible influences of certain procedures (e.g., experience with the elicitation mechanism, practice 
using the mechanism, etc.). In addition, our analysis includes mainly experiments that provide 
some sort of incentive for truthful revelation of valuations. Studies using purely hypothetical 
methodologies were not included unless they focused specifically on the issues examined in this 
paper.3  
                                                 
2
 To be clear, we use “endowment effect theory” to refer to the theory that observed gaps can be explained by some 
feature of human preferences that leads owners to resist selling goods because (1) selling is perceived as “losing” the 
endowed good, and (2) individuals are generally loss averse. 
3
 Note that the list of experiments using hypothetical elicitation methods reported in Table 1 is not all-inclusive. We 
limited the list to include a sufficient number of hypothetical experiments to demonstrate that gaps are almost always 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Each row displayed in Table 1 represents a particular experiment.4 The first column of the table 
indicates the study in which the experiment is reported. The second column indicates whether a 
statistically significant gap was reported as resulting from the particular experiment. Each 
remaining column of the table specifies a particular experimental design feature or gap 
measurement technique. There are five such columns: explanation of optimal responses, provision 
of practice rounds, incentive compatibility of the elicitation mechanism, the mechanism used to 
elicit valuations and the method of gap measurement. We explain these in turn.  
Explanation of Optimal Response 
A shaded cell in this column indicates that the experimenter provided subjects with some 
explanation of the optimal response corresponding to the elicitation mechanism. Explanation 
entails describing to the subjects the substantive features or purposes of the mechanism and the 
potential benefits of employing a particular strategy. It is important to note that the level of 
explanation varies substantially across experiments. For example, in Kahneman et al. (1990) and in 
our replication of this experiment subjects simply were provided with the suggestion (sometimes 
incorrectly) that “[i]t is in [their] best interest to answer…questions truthfully.” This type of 
explanation is indicated as “suggested.” In Brookshire and Coursey (1987) the experimenters 
explained in some detail the elicitation mechanism and used numerical examples to illustrate the 
mechanics of the elicitation device. The experimenters, however, did not advise subjects on optimal 
responses.  
Practice Rounds Provided 
In experiments in which practice rounds were provided subjects gained experience with the 
elicitation mechanism while tutoring was available and were encouraged to ask questions. Blank 
cells indicate that no practice rounds were provided. In some cases practice rounds were provided 
but not paid. These cases are indicated by cells marked as “hypothetical.” If the practice rounds 
were paid then the cells are shaded. In experiments providing paid practice subjects made decisions 
and experienced the actual consequences of those decisions (i.e., gained or lost money or goods) 
                                                                                                                                                                 
observed when subjects are not provided any incentive to truthfully reveal their valuations. Including more hypothetical 
experiments in the list would not teach us more than what we learn from the patterns revealed in Table 1. 
4
 The Appendix provides some additional information about the specific experiments cited: the issue under 
investigation, the good used, attributes of the subject pool, endowment to buyers and the measurement instrument. 
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under conditions similar to those researchers employed to elicit WTA and WTP responses used to 
measure the gap. 
“Random” indicates that the study paid only a small subset of the subjects or a small subset of 
the rounds. For example, Kahneman et al. (1990) randomly selected a certain number of the 
subjects to be paid at the end of the experiment. In other treatments, they randomly selected one of 
many rounds to be binding at the end of the experiment.5  
“Pooled” indicates studies that measured the gap using data aggregated across rounds. In such 
studies there is no clear distinction between practice rounds and gap measurement rounds. For 
instance, Harless (1989) measures the gap by aggregating data from 12 rounds before which 
subjects had no paid practice rounds. Before the first round subjects had no experience using the 
mechanism, but gained experience as they proceeded through the 12 rounds. 
Valuations Elicited Using Incentive Compatible Mechanism 
When experimenters elicit valuations using incentive compatible mechanisms, care is taken to 
measure “true” valuations void of the influences of strategic behavior. Blank cells in this column 
indicate that the mechanism used to elicit valuations was not incentive compatible. Therefore, 
when evaluating these experiments one cannot assume that the responses elicited represent the 
“true” valuations of the subjects. Shaded cells indicate that the experimenters used a theoretically 
incentive compatible mechanism to elicit valuations. The actual mechanisms used are described 
next. 
Valuations Elicited Using Market Environment with Some Incentives 
This column reveals that experimenters have employed a wide variety of market environments to 
elicit valuations. Blank cells indicate that the experiment elicited valuations outside a market 
environment. Experiments employing market environments and/or some incentives have used 
Smith auctions, binary choice designs, sealed-bid one-price auctions, double auction call markets, 
Vickrey auctions and the Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (“BDM”) mechanism (ordered from least 
(theoretically) incentive compatible to most (theoretically) incentive compatible). 
Gap Measured Directly Using Valuations 
The final column provides information about the method experimenters use to measure gaps. Blank 
cells indicate that the gap was measured using the number of trades relative to the predicted 
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number of trades.6 Shaded cells indicate that the gap is measured using the mean or median of 
actual WTP and WTA responses. 
Table 1 does not include information on other experimental procedures that differ across 
experiments. These include: the good, attributes of the subject pool, bounds or restrictions on bids, 
cash endowments to buyers, whether the seller is physically endowed with the good, anonymity of 
decisions and the statistical method used to measure the gap. Clearly such procedures possibly 
interact with unobserved variables such as subjects’ understanding, attention, motivation, etc., but 
the exact nature of such interactions is unknown. Such deep issues are not explored directly in this 
study, but our procedures control for as many as possible. 
Table 1 clearly answers any question about the consensus concerning the existence and nature 
of the gap. In short, no consensus exists. Furthermore, the Table suggests that the likelihood an 
experiment results in a WTA-WTP gap appears to be related to the experimental procedures.7 
 
3  KKT Replication Design and Results 
This section discusses the experiment design reported in KKT (1990), which we attempt to 
replicate. The results from our replication indicate that our attempt was successful. When using the 
design reported by KKT we observe a WTA-WTP gap. 
We conducted two identical sessions with undergraduates from the California Institute of 
Technology. Each session consisted of two unpaid practice rounds using induced-value tokens and 
one binding round using mugs bearing a Caltech logo purchased at the bookstore for approximately 
$7.00 each. The sessions lasted approximately 15 minutes and subjects earned less than $10. 
Payouts were not made anonymously.  
The instructions replicated those used by KKT to test for misconceptions by subjects (referred 
to as “Experiment 5” in their paper). One-half of the subjects were given mugs and referred to as 
                                                                                                                                                                 
5
 Note that Holt (1986) demonstrated that if the experimenter elicits valuations of a number of lotteries over several 
rounds and then randomly selects one round for which subjects will be paid, mechanisms designed to produce truthful 
revelations of valuations will not necessarily produce such revelations. 
6
 Here we note an important point about methods used to measure the gap. If the goal of measuring the gap is to 
conclude whether WTA is significantly higher than WTP, then a distinction should be made between direct and indirect 
measurements. Specifically, comparing the number of actual trades to the predicted number of trades might not 
accurately reveal how WTA relates to WTP. Franciosi et al. (1996) provides a clear example demonstrating that this 
measure might not accurately determine whether a significant gap between WTA and WTP exists in the data. The 
reader should keep this point in mind when considering Table 1. 
7
 We did not attempt to include all studies that might have some bearing on the issue; therefore, the table should not be 
interpreted as a “meta analysis.” 
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“sellers.” The remaining subjects were referred to as “buyers” and received no mugs. Buyers were 
allowed to inspect the mug of the seller sitting next to them. Each subject was assigned the same 
role in each of the three rounds (i.e., once a buyer, always a buyer). All subjects used the list 
method to reveal their values for the mug.8 We used the BDM mechanism to determine which 
subjects would transact and the price at which transactions would occur.9 Buyers used their own 
money and were told that credit and change were available before the start of the experiment. 
The data collected during the mug round of the KKT replication is displayed in Table 2. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The mean WTP response was $1.74 (median = $1.50) and the mean WTA response was $4.72 
(median = $4.50). Statistical test results support the hypotheses that the two independent samples 
(WTA and WTP) were drawn from non-identical distributions and the median WTA is 
significantly greater than the median WTP.10 This result demonstrates a successful replication of 
the result obtained by KKT using the procedures employed in their study.11 
 
4 Plott/Zeiler Procedures and Results 
This section discusses our experiments, which implement the controls for subject misconceptions 
found in the literature. If observed WTA-WTP gaps are explained by endowment effect theory then 
we should observe a gap when we alter the procedures to control for subject misconceptions. As 
reported in detail below, however, we observed no gap. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
8
 See the Appendix for an example of the list subjects used to report their valuations. 
9
 The BDM mechanism pits each seller and buyer against a random bid. All sellers stating bids lower than the random 
bid sell the good, but receive an amount of money equal to the random bid. All buyers stating bids higher than the 
random bid buy the good but pay an amount of money equal to the random bid. Sellers who bid higher than the random 
bid and buyers who bid lower than the random bid do not transact. 
10
 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test resulted in a z value of -4.8 with a corresponding p value of 0.00; similarly, a test of 
the equality of medians resulted in a Pearson 2 statistic of 20 (probability of equal medians equals 0). These statistical 
tests are discussed in Sections 6.4 and 6.3, respectively, of Siegel and Castellan (1988). 
11
 We note here that KKT conducted induced value token rounds and used those data as evidence that their subjects had 
no misconceptions about how responses affected outcomes (i.e., subjects almost always rationally responded with their 
induced values). Our lottery data allow us to drawn similar conclusions about the level of subject understanding. When 
viewing our data for the lottery rounds with a certain dollar outcome (e.g., 30% chance of $2 and 70% chance of $2) 
we observe correct reporting of values similar to the accuracy for induced value rounds that were reported by KKT. 
That is, the proportion of subjects that gave the correct response was the same in our experiments as that reported by 
KKT. Yet, when the lotteries for certain outcomes are followed by additional procedures designed to remove 
misconceptions, as was done as part of our procedures, the behavior substantially changes. From that fact we conclude 
that data from induced value rounds or data from rounds involving lotteries for certain outcomes should not be used to 
test for the existence of (or absence of) misconceptions. 
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4.1  Plott/Zeiler Procedures 
We collected three sets of data. Two sessions of the experiment were conducted with law students 
at the University of Southern California Law School in Los Angeles. One session was conducted 
with undergraduate students at Pasadena City College in Pasadena. Each session consisted of a 
detailed training session, two unpaid practice rounds, 14 paid rounds using lotteries and 1 paid 
round using mugs. The sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes, and subjects earned $32 on 
average (including a $5 show-up fee). Upon entering the room, each subject chose a laminated card 
at random indicating the subject’s identification number. The subjects were told to keep the 
identification numbers private to facilitate anonymous payouts at the end of the experiment. Also, 
subjects were asked to avoid communicating with other subjects and verbally reacting to events 
that occurred during the experiment. 
We designed the procedures explicitly to control for concerns identified in the literature. In 
particular, Table 1 suggests that a gap is observed less often when an incentive compatible 
mechanism is used to elicit valuations and training and paid practice rounds are provided. Table 1 
also reveals the absence of a particular and important set of procedures. Our analysis of the 
literature reveals that no one experiment designed to study WTA-WTP gaps implements a 
complete set of controls: an incentive compatible elicitation device, training, paid practice and 
anonymity. We fill this void with our experiment design.  
First, using an incentive compatible elicitation device (e.g., BDM) gives subjects an incentive 
to announce their actual valuations for the good with the goal of increasing the probability of 
earning the maximum amount possible. Lack of incentives can be associated with several features 
of arbitrary behavior. Although the specific reasons incentives might operate in such a manner is 
not well known, presumably incentives focus behavior in the sense that attention, thought, and care 
in understanding instructions depend on the nature of incentives. If earnings depend on subjects’ 
decisions, subjects probably are more likely to allocate attention to instructions and decisions 
during experiments.  
Second, training provides subjects with a basic understanding of the mechanism used to elicit 
valuations. Mechanisms used to elicit valuations might be unfamiliar to subjects or, more 
importantly, might be so similar to mechanisms with which subjects are familiar that subtle and 
important differences go unnoticed despite experimental controls. Many designs use incentive 
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compatible mechanisms such as the BDM mechanism to elicit non-strategic valuations from 
subjects. These mechanisms, however, most likely are unfamiliar to subjects even though the task 
might appear to be a common buying or selling task. When confronted with an auction of any type, 
individuals might tend to operate under familiar auction rules (i.e., highest bidder takes the good 
and pays the amount he offered). Therefore, even if subjects are told it is in their best interest to bid 
their “true value,” misconceptions about how the elicitation mechanism works might trigger 
subjects to default to the strategies associated with familiar auctions.  
Our approach is based on a presumption that, to accurately measure preferences, 
misconceptions about the valuation elicitation mechanism must be eliminated. The presumption is 
that subjects must have a good operational understanding of procedures including the available 
alternatives and the mapping of revealed valuations to consequences. Decision theorists might find 
the language used to describe procedures to be very clear because they are trained to give 
operational meaning to technical language, e.g., “true value.”12 To those not so schooled, however, 
the language can be unclear. In many cases conducting paid practice rounds might be necessary to 
ensure that subjects understand the procedures and how revealed valuations map into 
consequences. 
As part of the training process, numerical examples provide concrete illustrations, allowing 
subjects to see the mechanism in terms of its purpose. In addition, specific examples are used to 
illustrate why announcing valuations that are not actual valuations is a dominated strategy when the 
BDM mechanism is employed. 
Third, practice rounds allow subjects to learn by gaining familiarly with the mechanism while 
still educating themselves about its properties. Encouraging questions during the practice rounds 
assists subjects in clearing up any misconceptions. In addition, the non-anonymous practice rounds 
give the experimenter an opportunity to check whether subjects were displaying behavior 
consistent with a clear understanding of the valuation task.  
Providing paid practice rounds exposes subjects to the consequences of their decisions prior to 
the round during which subjects report valuations used to measure the WTA-WTP gap. It is well 
known that activities in people’s daily lives automatically place them in situations of strategic 
interaction. Strategic reactions developed to engage in those interactions might seep into behavior 
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exhibited in experiments in a manner that clouds gap measurement.13 For example, the use of the 
word “sell” can automatically call forth a margin above the minimum that an individual might 
accept in exchange for a good. Even if the word “sell” is not used, simply being in a situation that 
calls for selling behavior might trigger an instinctive reaction (e.g., sell high and buy low). Despite 
this, many theories rely on the assumption that subjects in experiments understand their tasks and 
that observed behavior is not a result of strategic behaviors evoked by instructions. Interpreting 
data that might contain a mixing of motives layered over actual valuations can prove difficult, 
however.  
Likewise, if subjects mistakenly believe that outcomes are manipulable, they might behave 
according to a strategy the mechanism does not reward. For example, if a subject is asked to 
provide a “selling price” that reflects his valuation for a good he owns, natural instincts might 
persuade him to announce an amount higher than his actual valuation. In fact, given bargaining 
instincts of sellers to inflate asks and buyers to deflate bids, those endowed with a good likely will 
bid more than their non-strategic valuations while those not endowed with a good likely will bid 
less than their non-strategic valuations. This behavior could be especially likely if subjects do not 
fully understand experimental procedures. 
To control for this possibility, during the paid rounds subjects learn about the intricacies of the 
elicitation mechanism and are given an opportunity to adjust non-optimal strategies to maximize 
their payouts. Most importantly, this learning and adjustment process takes place before the gap is 
measured, minimizing the possibility that the measurement of the gap includes strategic responses 
or responses that are clouded by misconceptions about the mechanism. 
Finally, anonymity in decisions and payouts is ensured. Some commentators (e.g., Posner and 
Fremling, 2001) hypothesize that if decisions are not made anonymously, subjects might be 
concerned with how others view them. For example, talented and successful bargainers tend to sell 
high and buy low. Therefore, if a subject wishes to be known by other subjects or the experimenter 
as a talented bargainer he might adjust his behavior accordingly even if the elicitation device does 
not reward that type of behavior. In addition, when making anonymous decisions, subjects might 
be less inclined to ponder the “correct” answer as viewed by others, and instead focus on choosing 
                                                                                                                                                                 
12
 Consider another example. Economists might have a clear meaning of what a “preference” is but subjects might not 
clearly recognize this property within themselves or associate it with other words such as likes, dislikes, wants, wishes, 
etc. 
13
  For an evolutionary theory of this phenomenon, see Heifetz and Segev (2001). 
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the amount that will reward them the most. While we attach no particular weight to any number of 
ideas about how subjects might want to represent themselves, we remove the opportunity and 
incentives for any such attempt.  
After the two practice rounds, each subject participated in 15 paid rounds: 14 rounds conducted 
with lotteries and one round conducted with mugs. We used the data collected during the mug 
round to measure the gap. In the experiments including paid practice rounds, the mug round was 
conducted after the lottery rounds. In the experiment without paid practice rounds, the mug round 
was conducted before the lottery rounds. The first six lottery rounds involved lotteries with 
expected values of less than $1. The subjects were told that the lotteries would increase in 
magnitude, but the first few rounds allowed for additional (but paid) practice. All subjects acted as 
sellers in the first three lottery rounds and buyers in the second three lottery rounds. The first set of 
“large stakes” lottery rounds (4 in total) involved lotteries with expected values ranging from $2 to 
$8. All subjects acted as sellers during these rounds. During the second set of large stakes lottery 
rounds (4 in total), all subjects acted as buyers. Subjects were allowed to view only the lottery 
involved in the round being conducted. Table 3 summarizes the experiment design. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In the mug round, the item considered by the subjects was a plastic travel mug with a market 
price of approximately $8.50. The subjects were not informed of the market price. Approximately 
half the subjects acted as sellers and approximately half acted as buyers. All subjects were handed a 
mug before the start of the round. Sellers were told that they owned the mug. Buyers were told that 
they could inspect the mug but they did not own it. All subjects were prompted to record an offer 
(sellers offering the minimum amount they would accept to give up the mug, buyers offering the 
maximum amount they would pay in exchange for the mug). After offers were recorded subjects 
were prompted to consider whether the offer chosen was the actual non-strategic value and allowed 
to change the offer before committing to it. After all committed offers were collected (i.e., slips 
placed into the boxes), the predetermined fixed offer was announced. The subjects recorded their 
round payoffs and accumulated payoffs for the experiment.14 
4.2  Plott/Zeiler Results 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
14
 See the Appendix for detailed subject instructions and procedures. 
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Each subject revealed a personal valuation for a mug, either from the point of view of someone 
who owned the mug and is given an opportunity to sell it or from the point of view of someone 
who has no mug but is given the opportunity to buy one. Thus, we perform a between-subject test 
to determine whether a significant WTA-WTP gap resulted.  
In experiments 1 and 3 values for the mugs were collected after 14 rounds used to provide paid 
practice during which subjects made decisions involving binding lotteries. In experiment 2 such 
practice rounds were absent prior to the mug round. Table 4 contains data on subjects’ responses 
during the mug rounds. Data are reported for a total of 74 subjects.15 
Table 4 also provides summary statistics for each experiment. In experiment 1, the mean WTP 
response was $5.20 (median = $5.00) and the mean WTA response was $5.69 (median = $5.00). In 
experiment 2, the mean WTP response was $7.88 (median = $6.50) and the mean WTA response 
                                                 
15
 Theoretically the lottery rounds could be used to test for a WTA-WTP gap. The lottery round data, however, are 
contaminated by a design that was developed only for training and not for purposes of measuring a gap. All WTA 
rounds were conducted prior to the WTP rounds. Thus subjects had extensive training on one mechanism (i.e., selling 
using the BDM mechanism), the meaning of lotteries, the instructions, the procedures and other subtle features of the 
experiment design before being exposed to the second mechanism (i.e., buying using the BDM mechanism). Because 
the BDM mechanism would be more unfamiliar in a selling task than a buying task (subjects tend to have more 
experience buying than selling), the WTA rounds were used first. In addition to what appeared to us to be a logical 
approach to training, this procedure also ensured that subjects had money to spend in the WTP rounds, which 
eliminated complex explanations of collecting from losses, banking and borrowing that would otherwise make learning 
more difficult. Mistake corrections, public answers to questions and other procedures were also employed 
continuously, which confound the valuations provided in the lottery rounds and frustrate attempts to use these data to 
measure gaps. 
Of course, the data from these rounds are not uninteresting and contain some hints about the sources and nature of 
the misconceptions that the procedures help remove. We pass these along as mere speculations and conjectures with the 
hope that they will be useful in some way. First, subject misconceptions seemed to originate from three sources. The 
first source is the elicitation mechanism and the BDM procedure, in particular. Subjects seem to make two very 
different mistakes. Some subjects do not realize that overbidding (underbidding) in the buying (selling) task exposes 
them to a loss (if the price falls between the true valuation and the bid). Other subjects do not realize that underbidding 
(overbidding) in the buying (selling) task exposes them to an opportunity cost of a foregone profitable transaction. 
After instruction and, in some cases, experiencing these consequences, they seem to recognize and adjust to these 
features of the mechanism, sometimes only after repeated experiences.  
The second source of misconceptions is the concept of randomization and the nature of probability. In some cases 
subjects do not understand statistical independence; they seem to believe that they can predict the future from past 
events. In other cases subjects seem to believe that a particular outcome will occur with probability zero or one. As a 
result, subjects think that they have the capacity to guess the outcome, depending in part on an impulse or an urge. 
Experience seems necessary for subjects unfamiliar with random devices to incorporate true notions of randomization 
and the nature of probability. 
The third source is the assignment of value to a lottery where random devices are employed to determine monetary 
payoffs. Valuing lotteries is not a common activity for most subjects, and they do not perform this task with the 
immediate and automatic instincts of a decision theorist. Basically, the concept of an expected value is foreign to some 
subjects, and they struggle in various ways to quantify their preferences over lotteries. Experiencing the consequences 
of their choices might help subjects familiarize themselves with the random nature of the outcomes. 
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was $5.71 (median = $5.10). Finally, in experiment 3, the mean WTP response was $7.29 (median 
= $8.00) and the mean WTA response was $5.06 (median = $4.25). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
4.2.1 WTA-WTP Gap Results 
The main finding is striking and ubiquitous across experiments. No gap is observed. The following 
statements provide the details behind this finding.  
Result 1. The data do not support the hypothesis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP in 
both experiments using the BDM mechanism to elicit valuations and employing training, 
anonymity and paid practice rounds.  
Support. In Table 5 we report the results of statistical tests to determine whether the data 
support the hypothesis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP. For all experiments, we 
perform Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests, which test for whether the WTP and WTA samples were 
drawn from identical distributions, and median tests, which test for whether the WTP and WTA 
samples were drawn from distributions with identical medians.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The hypothesis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP when the BDM mechanism is used 
to elicit responses and training, anonymity and paid practice rounds are provided is not 
substantiated by the data in either experiment 1 or experiment 3. With respect to experiment 1, the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test statistic resulted in a z value of -0.079 (p= 0.9368); 
therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two independent samples were drawn from 
identical population distributions. In addition, a median test resulted in a Pearson 2 test statistic of 
0.0392 (p = 0.843); therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two independent 
samples were drawn from populations that have identical medians. These two statistical tests were 
also performed using the data collected during experiment 3. Similar results obtained: the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test statistic produced a z value of 1.738 (p = 0.0821) and the 
median test resulted in a Pearson 2 test statistic of 1.5159 (p = 0.218). 
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Result 2. The data do not support the hypothesis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP in 
the experiment using the BDM mechanism to elicit valuations and employing training and 
anonymity (with no paid practice rounds).  
Support. The hypothesis that WTA is significantly greater than WTP when the BDM 
mechanism is used to elicit responses and training and anonymity are provided (without paid 
practice rounds) is not substantiated by the data produced in experiment 2. The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney rank sum test statistic produced a z value of 0.928 (p = 0.3536) and the median test 
resulted in a Pearson 2 test statistic of 0.1548 (p = 0.694).16  
Clearly the extensive instruction and training might have removed misconceptions without a 
need for paid practice rounds to do so. It should be noted that other researchers conducted 
experiments without paid practice rounds and observed a gap. Other aspects of the instructions 
differed from ours, however. This fact might help reconcile our results with those obtained in other 
studies. The main point, however, is that paid practice rounds seem unnecessary in the presence of 
other procedures thought to control for subject misconceptions. 
Given the high variance in the data, we performed a check on the power of our statistical tests 
by testing the null hypothesis of WTA = 2WTP. Many claim that WTA seems to be twice WTP 
(see e.g., Dubourg, Jones-Lee and Loomes (1994) and Knetch, Tang and Thaler (2001)). A t test 
assuming unequal variances led to a rejection of the null in favor of the alternative, WTA < 2WTP 
(t = -5.06, p = 0.0000). A two-sample Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test also rejects this null 
(z = 4.64, p = 0.0000), as does a test of equal medians (Pearson 2 = 19.53, p = 0.0000). It also 
should be noted that, while we observe a WTP that is on average greater than a WTA, the 
difference is not statistically significant. 
4.2.2 House Money Effect Conjecture  
The dramatic difference between measurements taken under a full set of controls for 
misconceptions and the measurements taken under the KKT procedures motivates questions about 
how particular procedural features might contribute to the differences. One question focuses on 
whether “house money effects” might explain our results. Specifically, it could be that subjects 
might be more willing to spend money earned during the experiment than money taken from their 
own pockets. A house money effect might elevate WTP in a manner that eliminates the gap. More 
                                                 
16
 The individual data from experiment 2 suggests that the buyer who offered $23.00 for the mug might be driving the 
result. Evaluating the data without this high offer, however, produces identical results. 
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precisely, the hypothesis is that a house money effect acts asymmetrically to increase WTP and 
reduce the difference between WTP and WTA.17 The following result addresses this conjecture. 
Result 3. The data do not support the house money effect hypothesis. That is, there is no 
support for the hypothesis that money earned during the practice rounds accounts for the fact that 
WTA does not exceed WTP in our experiments. 
Support. The support for this result originates from two sources. First, in experiment 2 mug 
valuations are revealed before money is earned during the practice rounds. In that experiment house 
money effects could not have played a role because subjects did not earn money before they 
participated in the mug round. Yet in that experiment WTA did not exceed WTP. Thus, this 
experiment incorporated a direct control and provides no support for the house money effect 
conjecture. 
The second source of support is the revealed mug valuations themselves. The house money 
effect conjecture implies that there is some relationship between money earned in the practice 
rounds and the revealed mug valuations. To test for the existence of such a relationship we 
regressed individual revealed mug valuations against the amounts earned during the practice 
rounds. The regression analysis produced the following equations: 
WTPi  =  5.77     +     0.0108   Yi 
    (t = 3.816)    (t = 0.155) 
 
WTAi  =  5.37    +    0.005  Yi 
     (t = 3.55)    (t = 0.08) 
where Yi represents subject i’s income prior to the mug round. The regression results indicate that 
none of the variation in mug valuations is explained by variation in income earned during the 
practice rounds. Not only are the coefficients close to zero, but also they are not statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. These results allow us to reject 
strongly the hypothesis that income earned during the practice rounds had a substantial effect on 
either WTP or WTA. 
 
                                                 
17
 We are indebted to Colin Camerer, Richard Thaler and Leeat Yariv for drawing our attention to this hypothesis.   
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5 Discussion and Conclusions 
The issue explored here is not whether a WTP-WTA gap can be observed. Clearly, the experiments 
of KKT and others show not only that gaps can be observed, but also that they are replicable. 
Instead, our interest lies in the interpretation of observed gaps. The primary conclusion derived 
from the data reported here is that observed WTP-WTA gaps do not reflect a fundamental feature 
of human preferences. That is, endowment effect theory does not seem to explain observed gaps. In 
addition, our results suggest that observed gaps should not be interpreted as support for prospect 
theory. 
A review of the literature reveals that WTA-WTP gaps are not reliably observed across 
experimental designs. Given the nature of reported experimental designs, we posited that 
differences in experimental procedures might account for the differences across reported results. 
This conjecture prompted us to develop procedures to test for the robustness of the phenomenon. 
We conducted comparative experiments using procedures commonly used in studies that report 
observed gaps (i.e., KKT). We also employed a “revealed theory” methodology to identify 
procedures reported in the literature that provide clues about experimenter notions regarding 
subject misconceptions. We then conducted experiments that implemented the union of procedures 
used by experimentalists to control for subject misconceptions. The comparative experiments 
demonstrate that WTA-WTP gaps are indeed sensitive to experimental procedures. By 
implementing different procedures, the phenomenon can be turned on and off. When procedures 
used in studies that report the gap are employed, the gap is readily observed. When a full set of 
controls is implemented, the gap is not observed. 
The fact that the gap can be turned on and off demonstrates that interpreting gaps as support for 
endowment effect theory is problematic. The mere observation of the phenomenon does not 
support loss aversion: a very special form of preferences in which gains are valued less than losses. 
That the phenomenon can be turned on and off while holding the good constant supports a strong 
rejection of the claim that WTA-WTP gaps support a particular theory of preferences posited by 
prospect theory. Loss aversion might in some sense characterize preferences, but such a theory 
most likely does not explain observed WTA-WTP gaps. 
Exactly what accounts for observed WTA-WTP gaps? The thesis of this paper is that observed 
gaps are symptomatic of subjects’ misconceptions about the nature of the experimental task. The 
differences reported in the literature reflect differences in experimental controls for misconceptions 
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as opposed to differences in the nature of the commodity (e.g., candy, money, mugs, lotteries, etc.) 
under study. 
That said, we hasten to add that our thesis is not especially satisfying because we have neither a 
general theory of what might constitute misconceptions nor a set of operational definitions 
characterizing them. Constructing a full set of procedures to control for them could be very difficult 
as they might depend on such subtle features as the speed with which experimental instructions are 
delivered, the distance of subjects from the chalkboard if it is used, the size of writing on the board, 
how loud the instructions are read and the nature of pauses or emphasis, etc. Understanding appears 
to us to be a delicate matter and to fully control for it represents a daunting task. In fact, we have no 
direct evidence that our procedures actually eliminate all misconceptions about how revealed 
valuations map into payoffs. What we have shown, however, is that when an experiment 
simultaneously implements all known controls for misconceptions, a gap is not observed. 
Several possible interpretations avail themselves. Each is a matter of speculation, but we list 
them in order to facilitate discussion. One interpretation is that WTA-WTP gaps are observed when 
revealed valuations are confounded by ill-conceived motivations to announce something other than 
a “true” valuation. Under this interpretation the lack of robustness of the gap is due to differences 
in levels of understanding by the subjects. When the procedures and method for measuring the gap 
carefully control for such motivations, gaps are not observed. Under this interpretation, use of the 
label “endowment effect” to describe observed gaps reflects an inappropriate application of 
prospect theory. 
A second interpretation is that the procedures themselves remove attitudes that would foster 
any difference between WTA and WTP. In particular, according to this conjecture, by allowing the 
subjects to participate on both the buying side and the selling side of the lottery rounds, objects are 
translated into commodities for which ownership or loss plays no particular part in the preference 
formation process. Then, in the subsequent mug round, the attitude toward lotteries somehow is 
transferred to the mug. Under this interpretation the procedures (and not the actual measurement of 
preferences) play a role in the transformation of preferences influenced by loss aversion to 
preferences not influenced by loss aversion. Of course, prospect theory says nothing about such a 
dynamic development of preferences. No evidence exists to support the conjecture, and there is 
evidence that works against it. Specifically, in experiment 2 the mug round was conducted before 
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the subjects participated in the lottery round, and no gap was observed. Therefore, experience with 
the lotteries could not have played a crucial role in the disappearance of the gap in that instance. 
A third interpretation is that the procedures themselves involve a type of demand effect in 
which the subjects perceive that the experimenter wants to strip from responses any special value 
of ownership. The conjecture is that by responding to a demand that the answers be “thoughtful” 
the subjects remove from the response a preference related to “ownership” that would otherwise be 
reflected in choice. While the mechanism through which this transformation is supposed to take 
place is not clear, the conjecture itself cannot be rejected using the data from our experiments. 
A fourth interpretation is that the procedures suggested some particular value as the “correct” 
response and that our measurements recorded the suggested value as opposed to preferences. As 
the same procedures were used for all subjects, the conjecture implies that the valuations elicited 
from the subjects should all be similar. Our data, however, do not support this conjecture. We 
observed significant variance in responses for each experiment. We mention here one interesting 
aside. The test for understanding that KKT employed and that we use as well (in conjunction with 
other procedures) could be subject to criticism under this conjecture. The fact that subjects reveal 
“correct” valuations might simply reflect their tendency to report the suggested value (i.e., the 
certain lottery value in our design or the induced token value in KKT’s design). Thus, correct 
answers under these conditions might not demonstrate that subjects understood the mechanism. 
A fifth interpretation is that the WTP-WTA gap reflects features of a decision process, as 
opposed to a preference. Plott (1996) advances a “discovered preference hypothesis,” positing that 
responses in experiments reflect a type of internal search process in which subjects use paid 
practice rounds along with trial and error to “discover” what their preferences. As the subjects gain 
experience, they begin to discover their preferences, which are then reflected in their behavior. The 
hypothesis is that stages of the process can be identified and during the initial stages, when the 
situation is least familiar to the subject, the effects of framing are most important. Under this 
interpretation prospect theory itself emerges as a stage of the process. Rather than describing a 
feature of preferences the theory describes the features of an early stage of the preference discovery 
process. Under this interpretation prospect theory becomes part of a theory of how the process of 
cognition interacts with preference formation and decision making. 
We do not take a stand on which of these interpretations is valid or answerable by our literature 
review and experimental results. In fact, we disagree on this point. We do agree, however, that 
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sorting out the conditions under which we observe a gap is a necessary precursor to understanding 
the nature of the gap. We also agree that endowment effect theory and prospect theory most likely 
does not explain observed WTA-WTP gaps. Finally, claims that WTP-WTA gaps are unrelated to 
experimental procedures are clearly misleading.18
                                                 
18
 See e.g., Korobkin (2003) who states that “[a]lthough experimental conditions probably have some explanatory 
power in some cases, the weight of the evidence suggests that it is extremely unlikely that the effect is merely an 
artifact of the experimental methods that demonstrate it.” 
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Table 1: Summary of the Literature by Experimental Design 
  
Result 
Reported 
Optimal Responses 
Explained 
Practice 
Rounds 
Performed 
 Valuations 
Elicited Using 
Incentive 
Compatible 
Mechanism 
Valuations 
Elicited Using 
Market 
Environment 
With Some 
Incentives 
Gap 
Measured 
Directly Using 
Valuations 
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 1) gap           
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 3) gap           
Corsey et al (1987; part 1) gap           
Corsey et al (1987; part 2) gap           
Brookshire and Corsey (1987; exp 1) gap           
Singh (1991; test 1 before learning) gap           
Dubourg et al (1994) gap           
Brookshire and Corsey (1987; exp 2) gap           
Knetsch (1989; test 1) gap       binary choice   
Bateman et al (2001) gap       binary choice   
Shogren et al (1994; stage 1, round 1) gap       Vickrey   
Boyce et al (1992) gap   hypothetical   BDM   
Knetsch (1989; test 2) gap   hypothetical   BDM   
Morrison (1997; part 2) gap   random/pooled   BDM   
Shogren et al (1994; stage 2) gap   random/pooled   Vickrey   
Bateman et al (1997; exp 2) gap   random/pooled   BDM   
Bateman et al (1997; exp 1) gap   random/pooled   BDM   
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 2) gap           
Brookshire and Corsey (1987; exp 3) gap       Smith auction   
Kahneman et al (1990; exp 6 & 7) gap incorrectly suggested     sealed bid   
Franciosi et al (1996; exp 1) gap incorrectly suggested     sealed bid   
Kahneman et al (1990; exp 1 & 2) gap incorrectly suggested random   sealed bid   
Kahneman et al (1990; exp 4) gap incorrectly suggested random/pooled   sealed bid   
Kahneman et al (1990; exp 3) gap incorrectly suggested pooled   sealed bid   
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994; exp 1) gap suggested     BDM   
Kahneman et al (1990; exp 5) gap suggested hypothetical   BDM   
Shogren et al (2001; BDM) gap suggested random/pooled   BDM   
Knetsch and Sinden (1984; test 4) no gap           
Singh (1991; test 2 before learning) no gap           
Singh (1991; tests 1 and 2 after learning) no gap      DA   
Shogren et al (1994; no available substitute) no gap   random/pooled   Vickrey   
Corsey et al (1987; part 3) no gap       Vickrey   
Morrison (1997; part 1) no gap   random/pooled   BDM   
Shogren et al (1994; stage 1, rounds 2-5) no gap   random/pooled   Vickrey   
Shogren et al (1994; available substitute) no gap   random/pooled   Vickrey   
Arlen et al (2002) no gap   random/pooled   binary choice   
Shogren et al (2001; Vickrey) no gap   random/pooled   Vickrey   
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994; exp 2) no gap suggested     BDM   
Harless (1989) no gap   pooled   Vickrey   
Optimal Response Explained: If blank, no explanation was provided. “Incorrectly suggested” indicates that the experimenter used a non-incentive 
compatible elicitation mechanism but told subjects that revealing true valuations was the optimal strategy. “Suggested” indicates that the experimenter 
correctly advised subjects that the optimal strategy called for truthful valuation revelation. If shaded, experimenter provided detailed explanation of 
the optimal response. 
Practice Rounds Performed: If blank, then no practice rounds were performed. “Hypothetical” indicates that practice rounds were not paid. “Random” 
indicates that randomly selected rounds were paid. “Pooled” indicates that the measurement of the gap includes valuations measured in first round 
(without experience) and valuations measured in later rounds (after experience). 
Valuations Elicited Using Incentive Compatible Mechanism: If blank, then non-incentive compatible mechanism used to elicit valuations. If shaded, 
then incentive compatible mechanism used to elicit valuations. 
Valuations Elicited Using Market Environment With Some Incentives: If blank, elicitation not was conducted in a market environment. If shaded, 
then elicitation was conducted in a market environment with some incentives. The type of market environment is indicated for each experiment. 
Gap Measured Directly Using Valuations: If blank, then gap measured using number of trades relative to predicted number of trades. If shaded, then 
gap measured using mean or median of actual WTP and WTA responses. 
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Table 2: Individual Subject Data and Summary Statistics from KKT Replication 
 
Treatment Individual Responses (in U.S. dollars) Mean Median Std. Dev. 
WTP 
(n = 29) 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 0.50, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.50 
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2.50, 2.50, 2.50, 3, 3, 3.50, 4.50, 5, 5 
1.74 1.50 1.46 
WTA 
(n = 29) 
0, 1.50, 2, 2, 2.50, 2.50, 3, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 3.50, 4, 4.50 
4.50, 5.50, 5.50, 5.50, 6, 6, 6, 6.50, 7, 7, 7, 7.50, 7.50, 7.50, 8.50 
4.72 4.50 2.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of Experiments and Order of the Rounds 
 
Rounds 1-3 Rounds 4-6 Rounds 7-10 Rounds 11-14 Round 15 
Experiment 1: 
(USC students) 
n = 31 
small stake sellers small stake buyers large stake sellers 
Large stake 
buyers 
mugs 
 
Round 1 Rounds 2-4 Rounds 5-7 Rounds 8-11 Rounds 12-15 
Experiment 2:  
(USC students) 
n = 26 
Mugs small stake sellers small stake buyers 
Large stake 
sellers 
large stake buyers 
 
Rounds 1-3 Rounds 4-6 Rounds 7-10 Rounds 11-14 Round 15 
Experiment 3: 
(PCC students)  
n= 17 
small stake sellers small stake buyers large stake sellers 
Large stake 
buyers 
mugs 
 
Note: Experiments 1 and 3 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed paid practice, training and anonymity. 
Experiment 2 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed training and anonymity (without paid practice rounds). 
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Table 4: Individual Subject Data and Summary Statistics 
 
Experiment Treatment Individual Responses (in U.S. dollars) Mean Median Std. Dev. 
WTP 
(n = 15) 
0, 1, 1.62, 3.50, 4, 4, 4.17, 
5, 6, 6, 6.50, 8, 8.75, 9.50, 10 
5.20 5.00 3.04 
Experiment 1: 
(USC / practice) WTA 
(n = 16) 
0, 0.01, 3, 3.75, 3.75, 3.75, 5, 
5, 5, 6, 6, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13.75 
5.69 5.00 3.83 
WTP 
(n = 12) 
1, 2, 3.50, 5, 5, 5, 
8, 8.50, 9, 11.50, 13, 23 
7.88 6.50 6.00 Experiment 2: 
(USC / No 
practice) WTA 
(n = 14) 
0.50, 1, 2, 2.50, 2.50, 4.50, 4.50, 
5.70, 6.25, 8, 8, 8.95, 12, 13.50 
5.71 5.10 4.00 
WTP 
(n = 9) 
2.50, 5.85, 6, 7.50, 
8, 8.50, 8.50, 8.78, 10 
7.29 8.00 2.23 
Experiment 3: 
(PCC / practice) WTA 
(n = 8) 
3, 3, 3.50, 3.50, 
5, 5, 7.50, 10 
5.06 4.25 2.50 
WTP 
(n = 36)  
 6.62 6.00 4.20 
Pooled Data 
WTA 
(n = 38) 
 5.56 5.00 3.58 
 
Note: Experiments 1 and 3 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed paid practice, training and anonymity. 
Experiment 2 used the BDM mechanism to elicit responses and employed training and anonymity (without paid practice rounds). 
 
           Table 5: Statistical Test Results 
 
 Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test  
(null hypothesis: identical distributions) 
Median Test 
(null hypothesis: populations have identical medians) 
 z p-value Conclusion ( = .05) Pearson 2 p-value Conclusion ( = .05) 
Experiment 1 (USC) -0.079 0.9368 Can’t reject null 0.0392 0.843 Can’t reject null 
Experiment 2 (USC) 0.928 0.3536 Can’t reject null 0.1548 0.694 Can’t reject null 
Experiment 3 (PCC) 1.738 0.0821 Can’t reject null 1.5159 0.218 Can’t reject null 
Pooled Data 1.267 0.2050 Can’t reject null 1.3523 0.245 Can’t reject null 
 
Notes:  
 
The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test indicates that WTA responses from different experiments were drawn from 
the same population and WTP responses from different experiments were drawn from the same population; therefore, pooling the 
data is appropriate. 
 
The Pearson 2 statistics were corrected for continuity.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: All Studies Included in Table 1 
 
This table lists all studies appearing in Table 1. The experiments appearing in bold print are those 
that reported a WTP-WTA gap. The others reported no gap. 
 
 Experiment Issue Under 
Investigation 
Commodity Subject Pool Cash to 
buyers 
Measurement 
Technique 
1 Knetsch et al. 
(1984) Test 1 
Does the WTP-
WTA gap 
persist in the 
lab? 
Lottery for 
goods worth $70 
or $50 cash 
Students No, but 
credit 
arranged 
χ2 on # with 
WTP/WTA at 
more/less than $2 
2 Knetsch et al. 
(1984) Test 2 
What happens 
if subjects are 
provided with 
experience? 
Lottery for 
goods worth $15 
or $10 cash 
Students No, but 
credit 
arranged 
χ2 on # with 
WTP/WTA at 
more/less than $2 
3 Knetsch et al. 
(1984) Test 3 
Robustness 
check:  
Different 
subjects 
Lottery for 
goods worth $70 
or $50 cash 
Part-time 
executive 
program 
students 
$3  χ2 on # with 
WTP/WTA at 
more/less than $3 
4 Knetsch et al. 
(1984) Test 4 
Robustness 
check:  Different 
parameters 
Lottery for goods 
worth $70 or $50 
cash 
Part-time 
executive 
program 
students 
$2, $3 or $4 χ2 on # with 
WTP/WTA at 
more/less than set 
amount 
5 Coursey et al. 
(1987) Part 1 
Effect of 
elicitation 
mechanism on 
the WTP-WTA 
gap 
Right to avoid 
bitter tasting 
liquid 
Undergrad 
business 
students 
None One-tailed rank 
sum test 
6 Coursey et al. 
(1987) Part 2 
Effect of 
elicitation 
mechanism on 
the WTP-WTA 
gap 
Right to avoid 
bitter tasting 
liquid (students 
sampled) 
Undergrad 
business 
students 
None One-tailed rank 
sum test 
7 Coursey et al. 
(1987) Part 3 
Effect of 
elicitation 
mechanism on 
the WTP-WTA 
gap 
Right to avoid 
bitter tasting 
liquid 
Undergrad 
business 
students 
$10  One-tailed rank 
sum test 
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8 Brookshire et 
al. (1987) 
Effect of 
different 
elicitation 
devices 
Increase in park 
tree density 
Residents 
near park 
N/A Unspecified 
9 Brookshire et 
al. (1987) 
Effect of 
different 
elicitation 
devices 
Increase in park 
tree density 
Residents 
near park 
N/A Unspecified 
10 Brookshire et 
al. (1987) 
Effect of 
different 
elicitation 
devices 
Increase in park 
tree density 
Residents 
near park 
Everyone 
received 
$15; in 
addition 
some buyers 
received 
additional 
$15 or $30 
Unspecified 
11 Harless (1989) Effect of truthful 
revelation 
mechanism and 
announcing 
dominant 
strategy to 
subjects 
Lottery tickets 
(some with 
expected value > 
0, some with 
expected value < 
0) 
Unspecified Everyone 
received $10 
and lottery 
tickets 
Nonparametric 
test (sign test) on 
ratio of 
WTP:WTA 
(within subject 
comparisons) 
12 Knetsch (1989) 
Test 1 
Direct test of 
reversibility of 
indifference 
curves 
Mugs and candy Students N/A Observation of 
proportion 
wanting to trade 
13 Knetsch (1989) 
Test 2 
Test of 
symmetry of 
exchange 
preferences 
1/2 given 2 
candy bars 
worth $2 each; 
1/2 given cash 
Economics 
students 
N/A χ2 test 
14 Kahneman et 
al. (1990) 
Experiments 
1&2 
To establish 
baseline and 
test of effect of 
the commodity 
on results 
Mugs and pens 
(price tags 
visible on pens) 
Advanced 
undergrad 
law and 
economics 
students 
No, but 
credit 
arranged 
If number of 
trades was less 
than ½, then 
WTP-WTA gap 
reported 
15 Kahneman et 
al. (1990) 
Experiment 3 
Does the list 
elicitation 
method affect 
the result? 
Pens Undergrad 
economics 
students 
None 
(buyers used 
own money 
to buy) 
If number of 
trades was less 
than ½, then 
WTP-WTA gap 
reported 
16 Kahneman et 
al. (1990) 
Experiment 4 
Effect of 
binding rounds 
Pens Undergrad 
economics 
students 
None 
(buyers used 
own money 
to buy) 
If number of 
trades was less 
than ½, then 
WTP-WTA gap 
reported 
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17 Kahneman et 
al. (1990) 
Experiment 5 
Test whether 
subjects 
misstate true 
preferences in 
an attempt to 
manipulate the 
clearing price 
Mugs Business 
statistics 
students 
None 
(buyers used 
own money 
to buy) 
If number of 
trades was less 
than ½, then 
WTP-WTA gap 
reported 
18 Kahneman et 
al. (1990) 
Experiments 
6&7 
Exp 6: Is gap 
caused by 
reluctance to 
sell or 
reluctance to 
buy (control for 
wealth effects) 
Exp 7: Does 
leaving price 
tag on the good 
matter? 
Mug (price tags 
left on mugs for 
experiment 7) 
Undergrad 
students 
None 
(buyers used 
own money 
to buy) 
If number of 
trades was less 
than ½, then 
WTP-WTA gap 
reported 
19 Singh (1991)  
Test 1 before 
learning 
Does learning 
through a 
market reduce 
the WTP-WTA 
gap? 
Lottery ticket: 
(1/2, $1, 1/2 $2) 
Civil 
servants 
$3 OR 2 
lottery 
tickets OR 
$1.50 + 1 
lottery ticket 
Dixon and Mood 
sign test 
(nonparametric) 
20 Singh (1991) 
Test 2 before 
learning 
Does learning 
through a 
market reduce 
the WTP-WTA 
gap? 
Lottery ticket: 
(1/2, $1, 1/2 $2) 
Grad/ 
undergrad 
students 
$3 OR 2 
lottery tickets 
OR $1.50 + 1 
lottery ticket 
Dixon and Mood 
sign test 
(nonparametric) 
21 Singh (1991) 
Tests 1 and 2 
after learning 
Does learning 
through a 
market reduce 
the WTP-WTA 
gap? 
Lottery ticket: 
(1/2, $1, 1/2 $2) 
Civil servants 
AND grad/ 
undergrad 
students 
$3 OR 2 
lottery tickets 
OR $1.50 + 1 
lottery ticket 
Dixon and Mood 
sign test 
(nonparametric) 
22 Boyce et al. 
(1992) 
Why do 
hypothetical 
environmental 
survey results 
differ from lab 
results? 
Norfolk Island 
pine tree 
University 
staff 
members 
Buyers 
endowed 
with $40; 
sellers with 
tree + $30 
Nonparametric 
tests (Wilcoxon 
rank sum) 
23 Dubourg et al. 
(1994) 
What is the 
effect of 
imprecise 
preferences on 
the WTP-WTA 
gap? 
Increased road 
safety 
Random 
sample of 
public 
No Observation of 
announcements 
by subjects and 
ratios of 
WTA:WTP 
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24 Loewenstein 
and Issacharoff 
(1994; exp 1) 
Do people value 
objects more 
highly when 
they obtain 
them due to 
exemplary 
performance at 
a task? 
Mugs Students in 
executive 
education 
classes 
N/A t tests and 
ANOVA 
25 
 
Loewenstein 
and Issacharoff 
(1994; exp 2) 
Do people value 
objects more 
highly when 
they obtain them 
due to 
exemplary 
performance at a 
task? 
Mugs Students in 
executive 
education 
classes 
N/A t tests and 
ANOVA 
26 Shogren et al. 
(1994; Stage 1, 
round 1) 
Does degree of 
substitution 
drive the WTP-
WTA gap? 
Candy bars 
(market good) 
Undergrad 
and grad 
students 
recruited 
campus-wide 
Buyers 
endowed 
with inferior 
good + cash 
One-tailed t test; 
Mann-Whitney U 
test 
(nonparametric)                 
27 Shogren et al.  
(1994; Stage 1, 
rounds 2-5)  
Does degree of 
substitution 
drive the WTP-
WTA gap? 
Candy bars 
(market good) 
Undergrad 
and grad 
students 
recruited 
campus-wide 
Buyers 
endowed 
with inferior 
good + cash 
One-tailed t test; 
Mann-Whitney U 
test 
(nonparametric)                 
28 Shogren et al. 
(1994; stage 2)  
Does degree of 
substitution 
drive the WTP-
WTA gap? 
Safer food (non-
market good) 
Undergrad 
and grad 
students 
recruited 
campus-wide 
Buyers 
endowed 
with inferior 
good + cash 
One-tailed t test; 
Mann-Whitney U 
test 
(nonparametric)                 
29 Shogren et al. 
(1994; no 
available 
substitutes) 
Does degree of 
substitution 
drive the WTP-
WTA gap? 
High quality 
school mug and 
low quality 
plastic mug 
Undergrad 
and grad 
students 
recruited 
campus-wide 
Buyers 
endowed 
with inferior 
good + cash 
One-tailed t test; 
Wilcoxon rank-
sum test 
(nonparametric)                 
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30 Shogren et al. 
(1994; available 
substitutes) 
Does degree of 
substitution 
drive the WTP-
WTA gap? 
High quality 
school mug and 
low quality 
plastic mug 
Undergrad 
and grad 
students 
recruited 
campus-wide 
Buyers 
endowed 
with inferior 
good + cash 
One-tailed t test; 
Wilcoxon rank-
sum test 
(nonparametric)                 
31 Franciosi et al. 
(1996; exp 1) 
Effect on WTP-
WTA gap of 
elimination of 
buyer/seller/ 
price language? 
Mugs (price tag 
removed) 
Unspecified Buyers 
earned 
money from 
previous exp 
($8.75 to 
$44.50) 
t test 
32 Morrison (1997; 
Part 1) 
Do wealth 
effects matter? 
Candy (subjects 
told they could 
purchase the 
candy at a shop 
nearby for 33 
pence) 
Experimental 
economics 
students 
4 pounds to 
every subject 
(show up fee) 
Mann-Whitney U 
test and t test 
33 Morrison 
(1997; Part 2) 
Do wealth 
effects matter? 
Mugs (subjects 
told they could 
purchase the 
mug nearby for 
1.90 pounds) 
Buyers from 
Part 1 
became 
sellers and 
sellers from 
Part 1 
became 
buyers 
Cash equal 
to mean 
WTA value 
from 
another 
experiment 
Mann-Whitney U 
test and t test 
34 Bateman et al. 
(1997; exp 1) 
Does incentive 
compatible 
elicitation 
device change 
results? 
Coke (familiar 
good) 
Undergrads 
and post-
docs 
All subjects 
endowed 
with goods 
and cash 
Unspecified 
35 Bateman et al. 
(1997; exp 2) 
Does incentive 
compatible 
elicitation 
device change 
results? 
Premium 
chocolate candy 
(unfamiliar 
good) 
Undergrads 
and post-
docs 
All subjects 
endowed 
with goods 
and cash 
Unspecified 
36 Arlen et al.  
(2002) 
Is the WTP-
WTA gap robust 
to agency 
relationship? 
Mugs (with price 
tags) 
First year law 
students 
$5 to all 
subjects 
random-effects 
logit model 
37 Shogren et al. 
(2001; BDM) 
What is the 
impact of 
different 
auction 
mechanisms on 
the WTP-WTA 
gap? 
Candy bars and 
mugs (no price 
tags) 
Students $15 to all 
buyers 
t test and Mann-
Whitney U test 
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38 Shogren et al. 
(2001; Vickrey) 
What is the 
impact of 
different auction 
mechanisms on 
the WTP-WTA 
gap? 
Candy bars and 
mugs (no price 
tags) 
Students $15 to all 
buyers 
t-tests and Mann-
Whitney U-test 
39 Bateman et al.  
(2001) 
Do subjects feel 
loss aversion 
with respect to 
potential 
money outlays? 
Vouchers for 
luxury 
chocolates (easy 
to get from 
store); sample 
chocolates were 
displayed 
Undergrads No; subjects 
required to 
bring cash 
but did not 
have to 
spend it 
Mann-Whitney U 
test on ratio of 
WTA/WTP using 
geometric means 
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Appendix 2: Instructions Viewed by Subjects for KKT Replication 
 
Note that the seller instructions are identical except for the obvious adjustments. Also, the 
second hypothetical round was identical to the first hypothetical round except that that token 
value changed. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment in individual decision making. Our purpose is to study technical issues 
involved in decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. 
We will conduct two hypothetical rounds and one paid round. 
 
ROUND 1 (hypothetical)  
 
In this market the objects being traded are tokens. You are a buyer, so you have an opportunity to 
buy a token which has a value to you of $_________. It has this value to you because the 
experimenter will give you this much money for it. The value of the token is different for different 
individuals. 
 
For each of the prices listed below, please indicate whether you prefer to: (1) Buy a token at this 
price and cash it in for the sum of money indicated above, or (2) Not buy a token at this price. 
 
After you have finished, one of the prices listed below will be selected at random and any 
exchanges will take place at that price. If you have indicated you will buy at this price you will 
receive a token and will pay this amount of money; if you have indicated that you will not buy a 
token at this price then no exchange will be made and you do not pay anything. 
 
Notice the following two things:  
(1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be selected at 
random. 
(2) It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices listed below. 
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For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
   I Will Buy      I Will Not Buy 
The Token        The Token 
 
If the price is $0.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.50  _______  _______ 
If the price is $1.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $3.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $3.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $4.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $4.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $5.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $5.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $6.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $6.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $7.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $7.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $8.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $8.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $9.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $9.50  _______   _______ 
 
WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS 
 
ROUND 2  
(identical to Round 1 using different token value) 
 
ROUND 3 
 
You now do not own a mug. You have the option of buying one to take home by paying money for 
it.  
 
For each of the possible prices listed below, please indicate whether you wish to:  (1) Pay that 
amount of money and buy a mug, or (2) Not buy a mug at this price. 
 
After you have finished, one of the prices listed below will be selected at random and any 
exchanges will take place at that price. If you have indicated you will buy at this price you will 
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receive a mug and will pay this amount of money; if you have indicated that you will not buy a 
mug at this price then no exchange will be made and you do not pay anything. 
 
Notice the following two things:  
(1) Your decision can have no effect on the price actually used because the price will be selected at 
random.  
(2)  It is in your interest to indicate your true preferences at each of the possible prices listed below. 
 
For each price indicate your decision by marking an X in the appropriate column. 
 
I Will Buy   I Will Not Buy 
   The Mug      The Mug 
 
If the price is $0.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $0.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $1.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $2.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $3.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $3.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $4.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $4.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $5.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $5.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $6.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $6.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $7.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $7.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $8.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $8.50  _______   _______ 
If the price is $9.00  _______   _______ 
If the price is $9.50  _______   _______ 
 
WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS 
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Appendix 3: Instructions for Plott/Zeiler Experiment 
 
1 Set Up 
 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment, the experimenter placed an example of a buyer 
information sheet and a seller information sheet on the board. The subject’s offer, fixed offer, 
lottery outcome and payout calculation were left blank. In addition, a table indicating the frequency 
of digits (0-9) appearing in the random number table used to generate the fixed offers was placed 
on the board. For example,  
 
Table 1: Evidence Presented to Subjects to Show Random Nature of Random Number Generator 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
# of observations 22 21 21 19 12 23 16 22 19 25 200 
Frequency 11% 10.5% 10.5% 9.5% 6% 11.5% 8% 11% 9.5% 12.5% 100% 
 
 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the first 200 digits of the random number table used to generate 
fixed offers. If the table is indeed random each digit should be observed 10% of the time. The table 
is used to provide evidence to the subjects that the fixed offers are truly random. 
Table 2 indicates the lotteries by round and the range of the fixed offers. To reduce the 
variance in expected payouts, two different sets of lotteries were used. Subjects were split into two 
equally sized groups, Type A and Type B, as indicated below. For the experiment without binding 
outcome experiences, the mug round occurred before any of the lottery rounds, so the lotteries were 
used in rounds 2-15 rather than 1-14. The order of the lotteries was the same as in the experiments 
with binding outcome experiences. 
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Table 2: Lotteries by Round 
Round # Lottery for Type A Lottery for Type B Range for Fixed Offer 
Round 1 (0.5, .20, 0.5, .20) (0.5, .20, 0.5, .20) [0.00 – 0.99] 
Round 2 (0.5, .35, 0.5, .35) (0.5, .35, 0.5, .35) [0.00 – 0.99] 
Round 3 (0.3, .70, 0.7, -.20) (0.3, -.20, 0.7, .70) [0.00 – 0.99] 
Round 4 (0.5, .30, 0.5, .30) (0.5, .30, 0.5, .30) [0.00 – 0.99] 
Round 5 (0.5, .45, 0.5, .45) (0.5, .45, 0.5, .45) [0.00 – 0.99] 
Round 6 (0.3, .80, 0.7, -.10) (0.3, -.10, 0.7, .80) [0.00 – 0.99] 
Round 7 (0.7, 7.00, 0.3, 0.00) (0.7, 0.00, 0.3, 7.00) [0.00 – 8.00] 
Round 8 (0.4, 5.00, 0.6, 0.00) (0.4, 0.00, 0.6, 5.00) [0.00 – 6.00] 
Round 9 (0.5, 8.00, 0.5, -4.00) (0.5, -4.00, 0.5, 8.00) [0.00 – 9.00] 
Round 10 (0.3, 10.00, 0.7, 0.00) (0.3, 0.00, 0.7, 10.00) [0.00 – 11.00] 
Round 11 (0.7, 8.00, 0.3, 1.00) (0.7, 1.00, 0.3, 8.00) [0.00 – 9.00] 
Round 12 (0.4, 6.00, 0.6, 1.00) (0.4, 1.00, 0.6, 6.00) [0.00 – 7.00] 
Round 13 (0.5, 9.00, 0.5, -3.00) (0.5, -3.00, 0.5, 9.00) [0.00 – 10.00] 
Round 14 (0.3, 11.00, 0.7, 1.00) (0.3, 1.00, 0.7, 11.00) [0.00 – 12.00] 
 
In addition to receiving a show-up fee, subjects were given written instructions, which were 
read aloud at the beginning of the experiment. The instructions reported below are for the 
experiments with binding outcomes experiences. Modifications made for the instructions for the 
experiments without binding outcome experiences are shown in square brackets. The instructions 
were read aloud to the subjects. The information presented in the footnotes is explanatory for 
purposes of the paper and was not included in the written instructions. 
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2   Instructions Viewed By Subjects 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in individual decision-making. Our purpose is to study technical issues 
involved in decision-making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. 
The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you 
might earn a considerable amount of money or other things. What you earn will depend on the 
decisions you make. You will perform a series of buying tasks and a series of selling tasks. 
You have received a record and information packet.19 This is your own private information. Do 
not share it with anyone. We ask that you do not communicate with other people during the 
experiment. Please refrain from verbally reacting to events that occur during the experiment. This 
is very important. 
Buying Task: 
The buying task works as follows. The experimenter will offer an item for sale. Your task is to 
make an offer for the item and record it on your information sheet. You will also record your offer 
on a slip of paper and insert it into a box.20 
As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the maximum you would be willing to pay 
for the item and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this 
maximum, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the maximum you 
would be willing to pay and make that amount your offer. 
Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to 
your offer and to the offers of all other persons in the room. 
If your offer is more than or the same as the fixed offer then you buy the item. You had the 
high offer, so you are the buyer. But, here’s the interesting part. You do not pay the amount you 
offered. Instead, you pay the fixed offer, an amount equal to or less than your offer. 
                                                 
19
 See Sections 3 and 4 for examples of the record and information sheets. 
 
20
 At this point the experimenter explained how the slips would be used in determining the payoffs at the end of the 
experiment. For each round, the offer recorded on the slip would be compared to the offer recorded in the information 
and record packet. If the two offers differed, the subject would not be paid for that round. This mechanism prevents the 
subjects from revising their offers after the experimenter announces the fixed offer and lottery outcome. 
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Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 950, you have the high offer. You buy the 
item but pay only 950. 
If your offer is less than the fixed offer then you do not buy the item. Instead, you keep your 
money. 
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 1,020, you do not have the high offer. 
Therefore, you do not buy the item. You keep your money. 
As a buyer, you should offer exactly the maximum amount you would be willing to pay in 
exchange for the item being sold. 
Remember, there are no advantages to strategic behavior. Your best strategy is to determine 
your personal value for the item and record that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a 
“correct” value. Personal values can differ from individual to individual.21 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
21
  At this point, the experimenter drew the subjects’ attention away from the printed instructions to explain how to 
arrive at their actual WTP amounts and why responding with actual WTP is the best strategy. The experimenter 
provided the following example and explanation: 
 
“Imagine that I am a buyer and Item A is up for sale. How do I know what amount is the maximum I’d be willing 
to pay for Item A?   
 
Start with 1 cent.  Would I be willing to pay 1 cent for the item?  If so, then increase the amount to 2 cents.  If 
I’m willing to pay 2 cents, then increase further.  I keep increasing until I come to an amount that makes me 
indifferent between keeping the money and getting Item A.   
 
Example. Would I pay $1 for A? Yes. Would I pay $2 for A? Yes. Would I pay $5 for A? Yes. 
Would I pay $6 for A?  No, not $6. So I need to decrease. Would I pay $5.50? No, not that much. 
How about $5.25? I don’t care whether I end up with $5.25 or the item. Then that is the maximum I’d 
be willing to pay for Item A.  I’ll record that number on my information sheet. 
 
The key to determining the maximum you’d be willing to pay is remembering that you will not pay the 
amount you bid.  Instead, if you pay anything, you will pay the fixed amount. 
 
Why is my best strategy to bid the maximum I’d be willing to pay?  Let’s go back to the example: 
 
Say that I decide that the maximum I’d be willing to pay for Item A is $5.25.  
  
What happens if I bid less than $5.25?  Say I bid $5. 
 
If the fixed offer is, say, $5.10, then I don’t get the item. Had I bid $5.25, I would have received the 
item and had to pay only $5.10 for an item that I think is worth $5.25.  I lose out. 
 
  What happens if I bid higher than $5.25? Say I bid $5.50. 
 
If the fixed amount is $5.45, then I have to pay $5.45 for an item that I really think is worth only $5.25.  
I lose out. 
 
 40
Selling Task: 
The selling task works as follows. The experimenter wishes to buy an item that you own. Your 
task is to make an offer for the item and record it on your information sheet. You will also record 
your offer on a slip of paper and insert it into a box. 
 As you will see, your best strategy is to determine the minimum you would be willing to 
accept for the item and offer that amount. It will not be to your advantage to offer more than this 
minimum, and it will not be to your advantage to offer less. Simply determine the minimum you 
would be willing to accept and make that amount your offer. 
 Your offer will be compared to a fixed offer. The fixed offer will be completely unrelated to 
your offer and to the offers of all other persons in the room. 
 If your offer is less than or the same as the fixed offer then you sell the item. You had the 
low offer, so you are the seller. But, here’s the interesting part. You do not receive your offer. 
Instead, you receive the fixed offer, a price higher than your offer. 
Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 1,020, you have the low offer. You sell the 
item and you receive the fixed offer of 1,020. 
  If your offer is more than the fixed offer then you do not sell your item. You keep the item. 
 Example: if you offer 1,000 and the fixed offer is 950, you do not have the low offer. 
Therefore, you do not sell the item. 
 As a seller, you should offer the minimum amount you would be willing to accept in 
exchange for the item you own. 
 Just as you saw in the case of the buying task, there are no advantages to strategic behavior 
in the selling task. Your best strategy is to determine your personal value for the item and record 
that value as your offer. There is not necessarily a “correct” value. Personal values can differ from 
individual to individual.22 
                                                                                                                                                                 
After discussing the example, the experimenter encouraged and addressed questions from subjects.  After answering 
questions, the experimenter drew the subjects’ attention back to the instructions. 
 
22
 At this point, the experimenter drew the subjects’ attention away from the printed instructions to explain how to 
arrive at their actual WTA amounts and why responding with actual WTA is the best strategy. The experimenter 
provided the following example and explanation: 
 
“Imagine that I am a seller and I own Item B. How do I know what amount is the minimum I’d be willing to 
accept to give up Item B?   
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Information and Record Packets 
You have received an information and record packet. One page of the packet will be used for each 
round. Do not unstaple the pages until instructed to do so. 
Note that you will switch between the roles of buyer and seller. Each sheet will indicate the 
role you will play in each particular round at the top of the page. 
The following illustrations will help you understand how to use the packet. Please refer to the 
cover page of your packet as I go through the illustration on the board.23 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Start with $100.  Would I be willing to give up Item B in exchange for $100?  If so, then decrease the amount 
to $95. If I’m willing to accept $95 to give up Item B, then decrease further. I keep decreasing until I come to 
an amount that makes me indifferent between keeping Item B and getting the money.   
 
Example. Would I accept $10 to give up Item B? Yes. Would I accept $8 for B? Yes. Would I accept 
$7 for B? Yes. Would I accept $6 for B? No, not $6. So I need to increase. Would I accept $6.50? I 
don’t care whether I end up with $6.50 or Item B.  Then that is the minimum I’d be willing to accept 
for Item B.  I’ll record that number on my information sheet. 
 
The key to determining the minimum you’d be willing to accept is remembering that you will not receive the 
amount you ask for.  Instead, if you receive anything, you will always get the fixed amount. 
 
Why is my best strategy to bid the minimum I’d be willing to accept?  Let’s go back to the example: 
 
Say I decide that the minimum I’d be willing to accept for Item B is $6.50. 
 
 What happens if I ask for less than $6.50?   Say I ask for only $6. 
 
If the fixed amount is, say, $6.25, then I have to sell my item.  I lose out because I have to give up Item 
B which I think is worth $6.50, but I only get $6.25 in exchange. 
 
  What happens if I ask for more than $6.50? Say I ask for $7. 
 
If the fixed amount is $6.75, then I do not sell.  But, had I bid $6.50, I would have sold the item and 
received $6.75 for an item that I think is worth only $6.50.  I lose out.” 
 
After discussing the example, the experimenter encouraged and addressed questions from subjects.  After answering 
questions, the experimenter drew the subjects’ attention back to the instructions. 
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 At this point, the experimenter called the subjects’ attention to the board where the buyer and seller information 
sheets were reproduced. The experimenter used the following examples to illustrate the use of the information sheets: 
 
“Each sheet of your packet relating to a buying task is similar to the one on the cover of your packet. The sheet 
indicates the round number. The item for which you will be making your offer appears next. The items are displayed as 
lotteries, even though in some cases no real lottery is involved. Let’s say the item is a lottery with a 70% chance of 
receiving 500 and a 30% chance of receiving 1,000. 
In each round, you should decide on an offer.  This offer will be compared to the fixed offer.  You may offer any 
amount you wish. 
How do I decide the maximum I would pay to receive this lottery ticket? I start low. Would I pay 100 for it? Sure. 
Would I pay 200 for it? Sure. How about 500? Yes. I would definitely pay 500 for it because I will receive 500 at a 
minimum and have a chance of winning 1,000. Would I pay 1,000 for it? No. I would not give up 1,000 because the 
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 You should keep track of your accumulated payments at the bottom of the sheet. Your 
earnings, which are yours to keep, are all accumulated payments from rounds 1 through 14 and the 
outcome from round 15. These will be paid to you in cash after the experiment. [Your earnings, 
which are yours to keep, will be paid to you in cash after the experiment.] To receive your 
earnings, please take the laminated card you received at the beginning of the experiment to Maria 
in Room 416 of the Law School. There you will be able to exchange your identification card for an 
                                                                                                                                                                 
ticket may be worth much less than 1,000, but no more than 1,000. So I should choose an amount between 500 and 
1,000. The amount I choose may differ from the most some other subject would pay to receive the ticket. 
Suppose the buyer decides to offer X for the lottery.  He would print ‘X’ in the box in step one [here the 
experimenter entered an ‘X’ in the “my offer” box].  Next, the previously generated fixed offer will be revealed. 
The fixed offers are in no way connected to your offer or the value of the item.  It is literally as if dice were rolled 
to determine the fixed offer. In order to assure you that the fixed offers are completely unrelated to your offers or your 
personal value of the item, the fixed offers were generated before the start of the experiment using a random number 
table. Such a table is designed to ensure that the results are unpredictable. If anyone is interested, on the board you can 
find the frequency chart for the first 200 digits of the random number table used to generate fixed offers [experimenter 
explained the table to the subjects]. Also, if anyone is interested in how we generated the fixed offers, please see me 
after the experiment is complete, and I will explain the process to you in detail. 
Now, back to the example. Suppose the fixed offer is 501. The buyer should record this value in the box in step 
two [experimenter recorded the fixed offer on the board]. Next, the lottery result will be determined [the experimenter 
explained how the marbles will be used to determine the result and uses the marbles to determine the lottery result 
here].  
Here the lottery result is _______.  So, the buyer should circle _______ in step 3 [experimenter circled the 
appropriate outcome]. 
In step 4, each buyer will calculate his round payment. In this example, assume the offer of X is more than the 
fixed offer of 501. He needs to complete only the left hand column in step 4.   He buys the lottery ticket.  His round 
payment is equal to the lottery result from step 3 minus the fixed offer, 501.  Therefore, his round payment is ________ 
[experimenter filled in the appropriate blanks on the board]. 
Alternatively, suppose the buyer offers X, but the fixed offer is 975.  Because his offer is less than the fixed offer, 
he does not buy the item. He has to fill in only the right hand column in step 4. His round payment is $0 [experimenter 
filled in the appropriate blanks on the board]. 
 
Please tear the first page of your packet off the staple at the bottom of the packet and flip to page two.  This is the 
seller information and record sheet. 
 
Consider the seller’s task.  She owns the ticket at the beginning of the round. Let’s say the lottery provides a 70% 
chance of receiving 1,000 and a 30% chance of receiving 1,000. She must decide the minimum she is willing to receive 
in exchange for the ticket.  Suppose she offers 1,000 (experimenter explains why the subject should be indifferent 
between the ticket and 1,000). She should print ‘1,000’ in the box in step 1 [experimenter entered ‘1,000’ in the ‘my 
offer’ box]. Suppose the fixed offer is 950 and the lottery result is ______[experimenter filled in the appropriate blank 
on the board and circled the appropriate lottery outcome]. After filling in the appropriate information for steps 2 and 3, 
she needs to calculate her round payment. In this example, her offer is more than the fixed offer; therefore, she does not 
sell.  She only needs to fill in the right hand column in step 4. She receives the lottery result [experimenter filled in the 
appropriate blank on the board]. 
Alternatively, suppose the fixed offer is 1,020. Her offer is now less than the fixed offer; therefore, she sells.  She 
only needs to fill out the left hand column in step 4. Her round payment is equal to the fixed offer. [experimenter filled 
in the appropriate blank on the board]” 
 
After discussing the examples, the experimenter encouraged and addressed questions from subjects.  After answering 
questions, the experimenter drew the subjects’ attention back to the instructions. 
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envelope containing your earnings. Note that the experimenter will not be able to link any specific 
subject to a subject identification number. Therefore the experimenter will not know subject 
payoffs by individual. Also, Maria will not know the amount of any subject’s payoff. The payoffs 
will be given to Maria in envelopes identified with subject numbers. Obtaining your envelope will 
end your participation in the experiment. 
Before we begin, note that the first several rounds involve relatively small payoffs. These 
rounds are intended to give you practice before you get to the rounds involving significant payoffs. 
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3   Sample Buyer Record Sheet 
The experimenter owns one Round 4 lottery ticket. I will offer to buy the lottery ticket for an 
amount equal to the maximum I am willing to pay for the ticket. 
 
 Round 4                         LOTTERY 
 
 
 
Step 1: decide on my offer        MY OFFER 
 
 
Step 2: listen for fixed offer     FIXED OFFER 
 announcement 
 
Step 3: circle the lottery result 
        A                B 
  $   0.30   $    0.30 
 
Step 4: how much did you make? (FILL IN ONE SIDE ONLY) 
If MY OFFER is more than FIXED OFFER       If MY OFFER is less than FIXED OFFER 
then, I BUY      then, I DO NOT BUY 
 
        (lottery result from step 3)   I get:  
 minus  
       (fixed offer from step 2) 
 equals  
              (the amount I get) 
      
Money made in previous rounds   __________ 
   + / - Money made (lost) in this round   __________ 
   = Total (copy to the next page)   __________ 
 
     50%       50% 
chance of  chance of 
      A         B 
  $  0.30    $  0.30 
 
$ 0.00 
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4 Sample Seller Record Sheet 
I own one Round 1 lottery ticket. I will offer to sell the lottery ticket for an amount equal to the 
minimum I am willing to accept in exchange for the ticket. 
 
 Round 1              LOTTERY 
 
 
 
Step 1: decide on my offer         MY OFFER 
 
 
Step 2: listen for fixed offer     FIXED OFFER 
 announcement 
 
Step 3: circle the lottery result 
        A           B 
  $   0.20   $    0.20 
 
Step 4: how much did you make? (FILL IN ONE SIDE ONLY) 
If MY OFFER is less than FIXED OFFER    If MY OFFER is more than FIXED OFFER 
then, I SELL     then, I DO NOT SELL 
 
I get:        I get: 
   (fixed offer from step 2)   (lottery result from step 3) 
  
 
 
Money made in previous rounds  __________ 
    + / - Money made (lost) in this round  __________ 
    = Total (copy to the next page)  __________ 
 
 
 
     50%       50% 
chance of  chance of 
      A        B 
  $  0.20    $  0.20 
 
 
